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Unity Out of Difference
BY THE HONORABLE WILEY

B.

RUTLEDGE*

The creative thing in this country, the miracle of America, is that
out of diversity and out of differences we have created unity. E Pluribus
Unum-I wonder whether we sometimes altogether realize, emotionally
as well as intellectually, what that means. It does not mean "Unum"
without "E Pluribus." Unity without difference is no miracle. Unity
without difference is death, or dictatorship, despotism. Unity out of
difference, a contradiction in terms, is as miraculous as the conception of
the Trinity.
It means to me the very essence of democracy. It means that we
could not have democracy if we all were alike. We could not have democracy if all of us were in agreement. It means that we must have difference,
division, disagreement, in order to achieve the unity which makes us one
in a manner which is different from the unity which makes other people
under other forms of government one.
And therefore for me the essential principle of democracy is not any
conception of equality of men or inequality of men. For me the essence
of democracy is the right to differ and to be respected in differences. That
goes for you, and by "you" I mean the advocates of all causes. That goes
for capital and for management. It goes for labor and its leaders. It
goes for the man so often ignored when those terms are used, the middle
man, the consumer. The principle means that he who holds the management and the control of financial power in his hand is not always right.
It means that he who holds the forces of labor, organized or unorganized, in his hand, is not always right. It means, too, that the consumer is
not always right. But each has an equal right, an indispensable right, to
state his view as he sees it and to fight for his advantage by whatever
legal and legitimate means the society in which he struggles may afford
at the time.
This necessarily means also that at some stages in the evolution of
society one case will be presented better and more effectively than the
*Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Address delivered at the
forty-sixth annual meeting of the Colorado Bar Association, Colorado Springs, September 17, 1943. (The introductory remarks of Mr. Justice Rutledge have been omitted.)
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other, that the ballot will swing in this direction or that or the other.
But that ballot is never a final ballot. When a final state of things is
achieved, when we reach the situation in which any of the major interests in our economic, social and political structure becomes secure so that
it cannot be affected by opposition, by the tensions and the strains of
opposing forces, then we will no longer have a democratic community.
And so down at the bottom of things, back beyond all the legal
formulas that we have created and that through the ages have come to us
-- due process of law, equal protection of the laws, the law of the land,
all our legal formulations of the principles of equality and democracybeyond them must reside in the spirit and in the minds of the people a
willingness and a freedom to differ. At the same time I exercise my own
right, I must concede the same right even to the person whose interests
at the moment seem too great. But there is one limit the essential character of our structure always requires, that whatever may be the maladjustment of particular controversies, the sum total of the adjustment
will be accomplished by democratic procedures. If in the great stresses
and strains of changing times any interest achieves the power to defy
accommodation to all other interests in the community by peaceful and
by lawful means, then we reach the limit, the point at which not only
the democratic ideal, but the democratic institution itself is in danger.
I am not one, frankly, who adheres to the philosophy that revolution is
never justified. If I were I perforce would be compelled to repudiate
Thomas Jefferson and all those who wrote our own Declaration of Independence and achieved the reality which it declared. There are times in
the history of men and of nations when the legal forces and powers of a
nation array themselves so thoroughly upon one side of a great social
conflict that the other side, morally though not legally, may be justified
in seeking relief by extralegal means. That necessarily is a Jeffersonian
principle. But it is one to which resort should be had only as a matter of
last accommodation, and then only to resolve the most fundamental
social conflicts.
Short of that, short of a situation in which the legal arrangements
are intolerably secured by some powerful interest in the community
which refuses accommodation to all others, the essence of the democratic
process is that each interest shall submit itself to the rule of law.
I am not one who divorces law from justice. I remember the last
political convention in which I participated. Perhaps it is appropriate
to refer to it now. Linda Lee was our justice of the peace in Boulder.
She was always nominated by both parties, and elected by the unanimous
suffrage of her community. God rest her soul! The last time we renominated her, when the expected had taken place, she arose to express her
thanks. She said, "Ladies and gentlemen of the convention: I thank
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you for the nomination. I appreciate your support, and I promise you
that in the future as in the past I shall run my court on the basis of
justice and not law!" She did. The two, generally speaking, I believe.
do not differ. But there are instances, as we all know, when they clash.
When this is true, except in the rarest cases, it is better for the citizen, in
his own interest and in the community's interest, to accept what he regards as an unjust determination in preference to rebelling against the
system of adjudication. It takes an awfully rotten system of justice to
justify a revolution. And therefore we lawyers should be patient with
the people, because they do not always understand what they regard as
our injustices, and we should appreciate and support them because they
accept so much of our own imperfections. In short, an imperfect system
of law is generally, upon all but the rarest occasions, to be preferred to
the most perfect system of force.
Now I come to the application of that principle in its most important field for the future.
Do you realize how short a time it is we have been a nation? I
suppose we would count it from 1776; it will not be long until we will
be celebrating the 200th anniversary of that year. Two hundred years,
two centuries, twenty decades-what is that as history goes! What is
that when compared with the growth of the British nation under its
present institutions? Even before the Norman period those institutions
were developing, ripening toward the future. But our two centuries of
national life are only an interlude between two eternities. If we think in
somewhat shorter terms, we really have not been a nation, a solidified,
unified nation, a nation in which there is a unity we knew would not be
broken, a union in which the bond could not be and would not be severed, for longer than half that time-not half that time.
And if one thinks a little farther, how long has there been a Germany; how long an Italy; how long a Russia of continental dimensions:
how long a China, other than merely an aggregation of men and groups,
loosely and disjointedly connected?
We are in an age of nationalism, and it is not an old age. Actually,
the real force, the real power and the real principles of nationalism are
hardly more than a hundred years old. Before that men gave their allegiance to other men, to kings and princes and principalities. They were
not powers, they were little unions, tiny aggregations, not empires-growing into empires, of course, because through the history of the last
thousand years there has been a force that has been drawing men more
and more together and compelling them to unite in larger aggregates and
more complex structures. We have become so imbued, so impregnated
with the nationalistic idea during the last century, and particularly the
last fifty years, and with its logical outgrowth, the imperialistic idea,
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that we do not realize it is a very young, a very immature, a very adolescent notion.
The old sovereign loyalties were loyalties to persons. The ancient
loyalties were to feudal structures, not national in character. Those
structures were the ones on which the nationalistic structure grew, which
it succeeded and replaced. If one wishes history for authority, we should
find feudal, not nationalistic society as the pattern for the future.
But there was a force operating in the world too big for feudal
vessels to hold, one which burst out from their confinement. It was not
primarily a political force or a legal one. It included and comprehended
these, but there was something deeper, vaster and more fundamental than
any mere legal power or any political power on the face of the globe. It
was the inventive genius of man, his ever-ascendant struggle to conquer
the physical universe in which he lived. His success in that struggle began
-no, it did not begin with the invention of gunp6wder. We do not
know when it began, but that event was an enormous step forward.
With that creation of physical power and its evolution, the world has
shrunk into a smaller and smaller unit. Men refined this force, devised
implements for its use, and it shrank the earth, bringing men out of the
bow-and-arrow stage into stages of even closer connection.
The feudal structure was built upon the idea of impregnability, of
standing defensively in a particular spot. Its essence was localism. It
went down, not because men decided they wanted a new political system
or a new legal system or because their rights were unjustly created and
defended. It went down because men used the power of creation born
within them to subdue and bring out of nothing physical forces which
the world traditions and established institutions could not resist.
When we emerged from the feudalistic stage, we began to create the
life of states. On this continent we did that when our country was thirteen. And we decided to perpetuate the idea, not in the number thirteen,
thank God, but in the basic notion of a union or league of states-forerunner of a nation. Our first effort was nothing more than a loose league
of little nations; and it failed, because we did not realize even then how
far the unifying forces of man's inventiveness had brought him. But
soon we began to comprehend, for we are a practical people and when
we find something does not work we devise something else. And so we
arranged a larger and a more powerful union. We subjected our states
to law as before we had subjected men to law.
Men still resort to force. But they do not do so except with the
permission or under the penalty of the law. There is no room now in
our society for the individual outlaw. We have abolished the institution
of outlawry. Nor is there room within our nation for the outlaw state.
Coming as I do originally from the South, with ancestors on both sides
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of southern origin, I know that the issue of the Civil War inevitably was
to make what had been a league into a nation, an entity worthy of all
of our loyalties, superior to any local loyalty to which individually we
are attached.
All through these years has that process, physical and legal, advanced. We may have assumed that we and the other nations of the
earth had attained our ends. We have not. There is a fatalistic and
cynical philosophy, which I fear still has great vitality, that the idea of
law for the world is impracticable, is unworkable, that it cannot be done.
As a man of law, as one who believes in revolution only as the last
recourse against long-continued and gross injustice, as one therefore devoted to the legal principle, I maintain that there is no limit in human
society to its application. It is a principle that imperfect law is better
than perfect force. That principle has validity among men, between you
and me, between you and your neighbor. It has validity between states,
between Massachusetts and Virginia, between Kentucky and Coloradobetween even Kansas and Colorado! It has validity also between this
nation and other nations.
It is valid now, not only because of its inherent validity as a principle, but because we have had twice demonstrated within twenty-five
years that the only other alternative will not work! We are not alone;
we do not live by ourselves; we are no longer free to decide that question
exclusively for ourselves; we live in a world in which. others also have
the power to make that decision for us. I am not proud of the way it
was made the last time. I give due credit for sincerity and patriotism to
those who then thought we did not need to act, who felt we could remain aloof. They did not read the facts aright. They did not see that
we live in a world which is constantly shrinking, each day growing
smaller and smaller, drawing men together, subjecting you to my influence and me to yours, so that the man in Tokyo today is not as far away
as the man in Boston was from the man in Charleston in 1776.
With that physical shrinking of the universe, with the expansion
of man's power over distance and over space and over all of the forces
that go with their conquest, there is another thing to be remembered even
in Colorado, even on the Western Slope, with all your apparent security
of physical isolation. The only real security for the future is in the
expansion of the basic principles of our profession, the one step which as
yet has not been taken. That is security in law, in the legal organization
of human institutions, so that there may be law not only among men
and among states, but also among nations. I assert that if we do not
create law, in the sense we lawyers know it, and not as a mere abstract
idea or moral principle-unless we create laws among nations, with sanctions to enforce it as lawyers enforce law among men, as we enforce law
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among our states, we shall not maintain much longer the semblance of
law among ourselves or among our citizens. For by now it should be
clear that we cannot have law at home with anarchy rampant abroad.
We can have only the semblance of freedom here when international
conflicts not only disrupt our peace-time activities but threaten to disturb
our whole social structure every score of years.
The chance for us is really one of two things: to take our full
place as men of law in the creation of a legal structure for the world that
will keep the peace among nations; or to maintain ourselves in a state of
perpetual disorder which will crush any possibility of the maintenance
of free institutions within this land. We have the choice to adjudicate
or to fight whenever fighting may be forced upon us. I lay it down as a
premise of the essential legal structure that it must be shared and participated in by every power on earth capable of disturbing the earth's
peace. It would be silly, laughable, if we in Colorado should say that
the law applies to everybody but Dudley Hutchinson and Dexter Blount.
We do not create law that way. We place all men under restraint of law.
That is one thing we mean by equality before the law. We do not make
men equal, but we place them equally under legal restrictions. We place
the states of our Union under the same equality of legal restraint. And
we make no exception--neither Idaho nor Kentucky, not even Texas,
can stand independent of the power of the United States of America.
If Texas were outside the Union, more especially if Texas and the region
west of the Mississippi could defy the Union, what kind of a nation
would we have? Likewise, if we leave out of the legal structure of the
future the Soviet republic or the German nation or the Italian people or
the Japanese nation, if you leave any power, any force, out of that structure which is capable of disturbing the peace, and therefore the law of
the world, you foredoom it to failure, at the least to the experience which
we ourselves had, culminating in our Civil War, the necessity for resort
to arms eventually to establish the rule of law.
One in my place cannot speak too closely about the present. But
there are some fundamental things even judges can say. I think there is
almost universal agreement in this country today that we do not want
to repeat what we have done twice in twenty-five years. I think there is
almost universal agreement that if we are not to repeat those experiences
we must create some kind of a legal structure which will be effective to
restrain any power which can threaten the peace and the law of the
world. But I am not so sure we have set our hearts so solidly on that
desire or our minds so clearly on the main objective that we may not
back out of it. The greatest danger, in my mind, is not the conflict of
arms in Europe, in the South Pacific and in the other arenas of this military conflict. The greatest danger of this nation is that it will divide
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itself again over the way, the method, the how we shall do what we all
agree should be done. I pray God that will not happen. For, if we
divide, there is little chance that the rest of the world will be able to
create a force able to offset our own withdrawal.
So if I have a word in summary to say to you, it is: yes. let us
discuss, let us debate, let us talk, let us differ. But let us do all this in the
spirit of the men who framed our fundamental law. Most of them
stayed to the end and saw the thing through. A few went home; great
men they were, but shortsighted. Even Patrick Henry opposed the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, he who sent out that great
lawyer's cry, the call to arms for freedom. Patrick Henry was a farsighted statesman when he did that. But I fear he was neither statesman
nor seer when, in querulous timidity over the details of our constitutional plan, he refused to accept it. Let us not repeat his mistake.
If the plan, whatever plan may be offered, seems imperfect; if it
involves risk, if it involves danger, remember two things. First, any plan
will involve risk and danger. And no plan at all will involve more risk
and more danger, in my judgment, than almost any plan that could be
devised.
In the second place, law is never perfect. I like to think of that old
adage lawyers frequently use, a government not of men but of laws. It
is a half-truth, not a whole-truth. All of us know there was never a
government on earth that was not a government of men. All laws have
their expression and their application through human action. But the
truth in the aphorism for me is that however imperfect law may be at
its best, still the man who applies it shall not apply his personal whim
or preference, but shall give effect to the great tradition of his community
as it has been determined in preceding ages and as it may fit, as nearly as
possible, the conditions under which he lives. That conception of a government of laws but not of men does not mean an inhuman or a nonhumane government. It means a government as nearly impersonal, as
nearly lacking in whimsicality and partiality as possible, though not one
which disregards the human factor or attempts to operate above or
beyond human power. So let us recall that however imperfect the first
proposal may be, however hard the compromise which may be required
to secure the consent of others whose viewpoint is not necessarily our
own, we will not be the first who have made compromises, we will not
be the first who have surrendered some part of independence, we will not
be the first who have given up a portion of sovereignty to achieve greater
law and greater freedom.
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Lawyers on the Scrap Pile
EDITOR OF DICTA,

Sir:

In the October, 1943, DICTA there is an article entitled: "Are
Lawyers Performing Services Essential to the Community or for the
War Effort?"
I am sure lawyers will qualify under item (17) : "Persons engaged in scrap business."
Some of our clients will vouch for the fact that we will also qualify
under (12) (d) "Workers at * * * extractive establishments."
HARRY C. GREEN.
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